STOTN
32
852 877 0802
P.34
20th February 1976, the Governor, when appointing
ayistrates, became obliyed
became obliged to comply with the provisions of
the Ordinance insofar as they were not inconsistent with the
Letters Patent and not to act inconsistently with them. The
Governor was bound by the implied obligation to receive and
consider the recommendations of the JSC, although he was not
Sound to act on any such recommendation. Moreover, it would
De inconsistent with his obligations under Article 11 of the
Letters Patent to comply with local law, simply to y-pass
the ordinance by purportedly delegating his powers to
appoint Bayistrates to the Chief Justice who was himself the
Chairman of the USC.
It was argued that the Governor's statutory
functions and duties to receive and consider the advice of
the JSC under .bla) cf the Ordinance were required to be
performed by the Governor personally or they could only be
exerciseu On the Governor's penali сп the Carltona
principles which would not permit Jelegation to the Chier
Justice. The contention was that unless those powers and
functions ~ere capable of selection, and has peen celegated
to the Chief Justice, he could not lawfully appoint a mayistrate. If the original delegation under s.63 of Cap. 1 nau been lawful It must have been impliedly revoked by the
enactment of the Crdinance. It not, it was contended, the
purporteo exercise of the power vy the Chief Justice at any
time after the coming into force of the Oruinance was
invalid as being inconsistent with his statutory duties under the urdinance and under the supreme Court Ordinance.
In my opinion these arguments depeno upon the true construction of s.15 of the Judicial Service Commission
urdinance which
in these terms:
"15. Nothing in this ordinance shall derogate from
(a)
any provision of the Letters Patent vesting in the Governor the power of appointing judicial officers, or
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