"OTKAUTOF
HDM.
952 977 0803
F.32
from any
There 15 thus no express limitation upon the
Governor's delegation power for which provision is mace ! s.63 of Cap. 1. Does any contrary intention appeal
Ordinance cr instrument so that s.os has no application to
the Governor's power to appoint under S.> ot the magistrates Ordinance, y virtue of s.2(1) of Cap. 1:
point.
i
•
the
nave already dealt with the in nis opinion"
AS to the Submission which depenas on
sayistrates ruinance which provides that a magistrate
appointej Jnuer tnat section cecomes a justice of the peace
appointment) since, ΤΟΥ the reasons I have
iven, I nois the opinion that the Governor's Article XIV
POWER
By virt
to appoint agistrates (as 'public officers") can lawfully ce Delegated, I d. not able to syres that upon the construction of that article the power to appoint
true
justices
the peace cannot silarly se delegates.
tne
Leaving aside for the moment the impact of enact ent of the Judicial Service Commission widinance, unable to discern any contrar; intention hach Cakes Cap. 1 inapplicable to s.t of the wayistrates rdinance
Instrument.
A
2n
Soverno:
It has Been Sumitted that even af s.us of Cap. i Jere rot entirely inapplicable" it as unlawfu For the
select the Chief Justice as the delegate of his power to appoint dyistrates. His functions as Chairman of the Judicial Service Commission the JSC ") are relied upon in this context too. It has also been contended that if it were possible for the Governor to delegate nis appointing power, the celegation hau to we to an officer within the executive branch of the Government, acting in tre name anu on penalf of the Governor (as examples, officers assisting in Government House and the Chief Secretary were mentioned). It was argued that such a delegation was subject to the
to the restrictions and limitations pointed to in the ladeninde case (mentioned in paragraph (4) of my