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CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS BR
852 840 1976
P.05
and thirdly, if satisfied that what limitations (if any) are to be
can play in criminal cases;
it has a part to play, placed on the doctrine.
doẹtřihe
Siz Owen Dixon defined the doctrine thus,
·
the,, acts of an officer de facto done in the apparently regular execution of his office have equal force and effect with those of an officer jure when...they concern the rights and duties of- the subject. There are questions outstanding as to the limits of this principle or controlling its operation."
વધ
the conditions
[Contributed to Res Judicata (VOL. 1 No. 4, October ly36, payes 229–237) the magazine of the Law Students Society of Victoria reprinted in Jesting Pilatel
Sir William Wade in his book on Administrative Daw (6th edition) refers to the doctrine in the following terms between pages 336 & 336.
"Officers and judges ue facto
In one class of cases there is
long-standing doctrine that collateral challenge is not to be allowed! where there is some unknown flaw in the appointment or authority of some officer or judge. The acts of the officer or judge may be held to be valid in law, even though his own appointment is invalid and in truth hẻ hás no legal power at all. The logic of annulling- all his acts has to yield to the desirability of upholding them where he has acted in the office under a general supposition of his competence to do so. In such à ́case ne is called an officer or juage de facto, as opposed to officer or judge de jure.
an
The House of Lorus applied this principle to an administrative authority
as to uphold a rate
levied DY
vestry although a number of the
vestrymen had not been duly elected. Loru Truro LC descripea them as vestrymen de facto and said:
"You will at once see to what it would
acts, Lead 19 the validity of their
when
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