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Britain, cooperation with China in the transitional period is
hampered by several factors. In the first place, British mistrust
of China is deep-rooted. Working together with China might impede
the pursuit of British national interests in Hong Kong in the
last years of colonial rule. Because of different needs and
definitions of the Hong Kong situation, the two governments'
perception of their own interests and the interests of Hong Kong
is bound to diverge. Given the antipathy of the Hong Kong people
to the Chinese government in general and to Chinese 'meddling'
in local affairs in particular, collaboration between Britain and
China might further confirm the 'lame duck' image of the colonial
government in the public mind. As many civil servants in Hong
Kong harbor extremely negative attitude toward China, closer
cooperation between the two governments is also likely to divide
the civil service and demoralize part of it. In short, in order
to enlist the support of China in the expansion of the political
authority in Hong Kong, Britain might have to run the risk of
eventually playing second fiddle to China in governing Hong Kong
in the transitional period. Unless the situation is desperate,
the colonial government is expected to be only lukewarm to the
formation of an allied Sino-British political authority to
bolster the declining authority of the colonial government.
Britain of course can choose to ally with other political
forces to buttress its political capability. To procure the
support of a foreign government or a number of foreign
governments is obviously an option. But in an age when
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