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independent of the Governor and had a status and power base
of his own, this could have advantages other than those
envisaged in paragraph 8, i.e. he would take responsibility
in place of the Governor (and HMG) for unpopular policies
and inefficiency. It is also possible that the Chinese
would be more prepared to deal with a PCE who comes from the
class who will provide the successor prominenz after 1997
rather more than they would deal with a Governor.
12.
In addition to paragraph 8, encouragement of the
development of local Hong Kong institutions which owe their
origin to local initiatives and comprise predominently those
who will provide the successors could constitute a forum in
which the Chinese would be prepared to discuss measures
implementing the Basic Law more readily than they would be
to discuss them with British officials (whether or not
within areas within the competence of the JLG) and also
remove appr
sions about changes or ossible changes
coming about 1 July 1997. In this connection a 'proto
L
Basic Law Committee' could well be a welcome development
nearer to 1997 to deal with transitional provisions and take
the threat out of Article 159.
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