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based on the confrontation of the two blocks had ended.
Instability was the price we had to pay for the momentous
changes which had, and were, taking place. It would be foolhardy to disengage the United States in those
circumstances.
6. Mr Maude moved on to the EES, which he thought could be
very beneficial in itself or as a stepping stone towards
full membership of the EC. Negotiations had to press on quickly. Mr Schori agreed.
CSCE
7. Discussion turned to the CSCE. Mr Schori thought it
needed a secretariat which could possibly be based in
Stockholm. The CSCE was one way to keep the United States
and Soviet Union involved in Europe. It was also good for
smaller states to be involved in such a forum. Sweden
welcomed the institutionalisation of the CSCE, but was
against creating a bureaucracy. A step by step approach was needed. Mr Maude agreed that this was in line with the
United Kingdom approach. A secretariat was necessary but we would resist the creation of a bureaucracy. The CSCE could
develop a conciliatory role in respect of frontiers.
Mr Schori said that Foreign Minister Andersson was keen on developing a CSCE role to cover the concerns of minority groups. He supported the idea of the CSCE appointing someone to report on minorities. Mr Maude observed that
minorities had been a dominant theme throughout history.
Their problems were capable of infinite analysis. Mr Schori
conceded this but said that the CSCE's efforts in this
direction were still embryonic. Sweden did not want the
CSCE to develop into a European United Nations leaving the
United Nations as a forum for the Third World only.
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