2.5
ONFIDENTIAL
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10.
Under the present proposal, if a Hong Kong government were trying to put through an amendment to
the Bill of Rights and an ordinance to that end had
been given approval for the first time by LegCo, the government would either have to wait until after the next election held at the regular time in order to go
back for second approval, or the Governor could exercise
his powers under Article XXVIII A of the Royal Instructions
and dissolve LegCo, thus forcing an election on this
issue.
11.
It is fair to observe, however, that there
appears to be no comparable right of dissolution by
the Chief Executive of the HKSAR. Under article 50
he will have a power of dissolution in a specific situation of conflict between the government and LegCo.
This
probably implies he has no power of dissolution in a situation such as I posit of a government and LegCo
in accord on a repressive measure and anxious to proceed.
Under the BL the Chief Executive could not call an early
election on the issue, and the government would have
to wait until the next regular election (to be held
every 4 years normally).
W
Power of LegCo to Adopt such an Entrenchment Procedure
12.
It would appear at first blush that LegCo
can now adopt such legislation as part of its general
authority under Article VII of the Letters Patent to
make laws "for the peace, order, and good government'
of Hong Kong, Enacting a procedure for adopting a certain
kind of law should be within the ambit of those broad
powers. However, the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865 seems to withhold from colonial legislatures which are not "representative" (i.e. of which at least one half
the members are not "elected by inhabitants") the power to impose "manner and form" requirements on themselves.
CONFIDENTIAL
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