A
CONFIDENTIAL
Para 6b)
Prior to 1997 the Chinese will insist on maintaining their position that official exchanges on Hong Kong are between the CPG and HMG. HKG's role will continue to be liaison at
a local level in Guangdong or in the normal context between Xinhua and the Hong Kong Government. A Hong Kong Office in Peking would be unlikely to have any significant part to play.
Para 6c)
If a Hong Kong Office is to be established in Peking before 1997, it should keep a certain distance from the Embassy. If it is seen as close to us, e.g. frequent consultations with Embassy officers, the Chinese will treat it as simply an outpost of this Embassy. This would greatly endanger its chances of continuing beyond 1997. For security reasons, we would not want to brief it in any detail. Its staff would not have the security of diplomatic protection. The Office would only safely be able to report on commercial developments in China of specific interest to Hong Kong a function presumably carried out by the TDC.
Para 6d)
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The Office would not be able to carry out this task. The Chinese at present are willing to deal with official visitors from Hong Kong only on the basis that they are visiting Peking on behalf of HMG. The Office would not be able to secure privileges for them at the airport etc. Official visitors also need considerable logistical back-up from the Embassy, e.g. classified briefing, secure storage of documents, secure communications.
Para бe)
We agree
Para 6f)
We agree
Para 6g)
I agree that visa issuing should be put on one side for the time being. I am deeply sceptical that the Chinese would every accept that the Office should have this role before 1997. If they did, they would again see the Office as being an out-housed part of our Visa Section, and this could be counter-productive in persuading them that the Office should i-sue entry permits for the SAR after 1997.
Paras 7a & b) We agree
Para 7c)
I find it difficult to believe that the Chinese are about to concede, or will concede even in 1995, that the Hong Kong Government should have a separate Office for external non-trade relations. Much of the very necessary liaison work on sensitive subjects in the years immediately before the handover would surely take place between an expanded Xinhua branch in Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Government. Trying to channel the bulk of business through Peking, even if the Chinese were to agree ot it, would not give the flexibility to react quickly to a changing environment.