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Committees investigating issues which were unwelcome to us.
They
have reconnonded that a hatte- proach might be to provide a 1. ster
setting out the UK approach, supplemented by an informal
off-the-record briefing of the Committee by a UK official outside
the formal hearing.
HONG KONG/CHINA RELATIONS
The
5. Chinese public accusations about subversion and
internationalisation have died down. But the Chinese remain deeply
suspicious about our motives over Hong Kong. They still believe we
are seeking to force concessions on China following the Tianenmon
Square incident, by playing the "public opinion card" and that we
are plotting to maintain our influence in Hong Kong after 1997.
visits by Sir Percy Cradock and the Governor to Peking have
re-engaged the Chinese in serious discussion of Hong Kong issues.
But they also continue to have recourse to "megaphone diplomacy".
The latests blasts have been about our assurances scheme and the
Basic Law. On the former, they strongly denounced the scheme on
30 December as a violation of the Joint Declaration and a
destabilising influence on Hong Kong. These accusations were
repeated at a meeting of the BLDC Sub-group on 17-20 January.
introduction of nationality restrictions on Legislative Council
members at this meeting is clearly one of the threatened
"corresponding measures" in reaction to our scheme. Also, at the Sub-Group meeting, Chinese drafters spoke of having made concessions: it was now up to the British to make some concessions.
The
6. The next meeting of the Joint Liaison Group takes place on
24-27 April in Peking. The last meeting in December in Hong Kong
showed some signs of a return to normal business: agreement was
reached on some minor JLG matters. We have tried to keep up the
momentum of JLG work through our offices in Hong Kong. However, the
success otherwise of JLG XV will essentially depend on the wider
political relationship and, in particular, the outcome on
constitutional development.
MAXAEW (5)
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