CONFIDENTIAL
ROUTINE
{
retention lapsed.
3. We doubt whether it is correct to state, as in para 3 of TUR, that Article 26 of the ICCPR prohibits discrimination on any ground including sex. While Article 26 is not limited simply to the rights within the Covenant, in substance it is concerned with equality before the Law and equal protection of the Law. The words quote in this respect unquote at the beginning of the second sentence of the article clearly link that sentence to the first sentence. Moreover, as para 5 of TUR recognises, the right to equality before the law and to equal protection of the law without any discrimination does not make all differences of treatment of whatever nature discriminatory We agree with your interpretation of Article 26 as in para 4 of TUR. We also agree (para 6 of TUR) that
that the differences reflected in your laws and practices are arguably based on reasonable and objective criteria.
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4. We have already indicated (para 3 of our telno 1831) that it is possible to argue, as in para 4 of TUR, that the right to own property is not human right and fundamental freedom as referred
to in Article 1 of CEDAW. We continue to believe that this line of argument is presentationally unattractive. This right is set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and might be said to exist in customary human rights law. The CEDAW Committee might look to the Universal Declaration as an appropriate source of rights. We might therefore be open to challenge. However, if this seems to be the only way forward, we would be willing to consider running the risk. After all, as we
we have extended ratification of the ICCPR to Hong Kong, subject to our reservations and declarations, we are already running risks in relation to property inheritance and rent concessions in Hong Kong as regards the ICCPR aspects of the argument. Extension of our ratification of CEDAW to Hong Kong makes no legal difference in this respect. (But we should not underestimate the political