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4.
It seems to me unlikely that China would seek to base objections on this Convention; at any rate, in relation to Article 15, I cannot imagine that China would wish to argue that in 1997 Hong Kong will "become" part of the territory of China!
5.
There being no clear rules of customary international law on treaty succession, as far as I can see it is as much in China's interests as ours to clarify the position explicitly in some manner or other; otherwise great confusion will result, to the disadvantage of all parties.
5.6.
The effectiveness of Option (C) or (D), assuming China agrees to one or other, will of course depend on the reactions of third States (and other depositaries, such as the UN Secretary General). This is illustrated by the fact that in 1979, despite the decision of the UK not to sign the Vienna Convention, we found it necessary to modify our practice by no longer seeking to conclude devolution agreements with dependent territories about to become independent. This was because a number of major depositaries were no longer willing to accept such agreements as effective and now do not include a newly independent territory among the parties to a multilateral treaty without first obtaining confirmation of its intention, notwithstanding the conclusion of a devolution agreement. [Submission from
Mr Simpson-Orlebar, UND, to Mr Stratton of 10 August 1979 in file UN P.374/5 1979.] However, since the circumstances of Hong Kong are entirely different doubt that those States would follow such a practice in this case. In the event (unlikely I would hope) of the arrangements we make with the Chinese meeting any objections elsewhere, I would not expect them to be based primarily on the provisions of the Vienna Convention/
23 April 1990
WM Banett
Jill Barrett
Legal Advisers
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CODE 18-77
GENAAS
CONFIDENTIAL