K
101001
REFERRED HD/HKD FOR DIST ADVICE
LNMDAN 2404
HMLNAN 3970
CONFIDENTIAL
DD 101200Z FCOLN
FM HOKON TO FCOLN 100940Z JUL
GRS 4.60
CONFIDENTIAL
FM HONG KONG
TO DESKBY 1012002I FCO
TELNO 2134
OF 100940Z JULY 90
REF TEL SUGGESTED
PERSONAL FOR PAUL. HKD FROM GOVERNOR
YRTELNO 1290: FUTURE OF THE GURKHAS IN HONG KONG
1. THERE IS LITTLE I CAN ADD TO WHAT I SAID TO MINISTERS IN LONDON. YOU MIGHT LIKE TO DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS.
2. MEMBERS OF THE BRIGADE OF GURKHAS. WHO CURRENTLY MAKE UP THE MAJORITY OF THE LAND FORCES BASED IN HONG KONG. SET GREAT STORE BY THE MINISTERIAL COMMITMENT THAT THERE WILL BE A ROLE FOR THE GURKHAS IN THE BRITISH ARMY AFTER 1997. SHOULD THAT COMMITMENT BE REVERSED, A SERIOUS MORALE PROBLEM WOULD DEVELOP VERY QUICKLY. THE OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY OF THE GURKHAS IN HONG KONG WOULD RAPIDLY BE ERODED. THE CBF HAS ADVISED ME THAT, IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO DISBAND THE GURKHAS IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME. A LENGTHY PROCESS WOULD CARRY SERIOUS PENALTIES IN TERMS OF OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY AND DISCIPLINE. I BELIEVE HE IS RIGHT IN
THIS JUDGEMENT.
3. DISBANDMENT OF UNITS EARLIER THAN ENVISAGED IN THE GARRISON WITHDRAWAL PLAN WOULD MEAN THAT REPLACEMENT BATTALIONS WOULD BE NEEDED FROM THE U K. HONG KONG HAS AT PRESENT ONLY ONE BARRACKS DESIGNED BOTH TO ACCOMMODATE A UK BATTALION, AND WITH FULL MARRIED QUARTERS. ANY ADDITIONAL UK BATTALIONS WOULD NEED TO BE ACCOMMODATED IN GURKHA STANDARD BARRACKS AND BE UNACCOMPANIED. WOULD MEAN THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE ROULEMENT BATTALIONS ON. 6 MONTH DUTY TOURS IN HONG KONG. SHORT TOURS OF THIS NATURE WOULD INEVITABLY REDUCE THEIR OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY BELOW THAT OF THE PRESENT GURKHA UNITS, PARTLY BECAUSE OF TRAINING LIMITATIONS AND PARTLY BECAUSE OF A LACK OF LOCAL KNOWLEDGE.
THIS SAY,
4. THE COST OF A GARRISON CONSISTING ENTIRELY OF UK BATTALIONS WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY GREATER THAN THE PRESENT OR LIKELY FUTURE MIX. EVEN IF WE DID NOT BUILD EXTRA BARRACK ACCOMMODATION (WHICH WOULD BE OUT OF THE QUESTION FOR SUCH A SHORT PERIOD) WE WOULD HAVE TO APPROACH THE LEGISLATURE FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDS, EITHER WITHIN OR OUTSIDE THE CONTEXT OF THE 1988 DCA. GIVEN THE BACKGROUND OF THE 1988 DCA AND THE FACT THAT THESE ADDITIONAL COSTS WOULD BE INCURRED AS A RESULT OF POLICY DECISIONS MADE BY HMG UNRELATED TO HONG KONG. WE WOULD HAVE TO ANTICIPATE MAJOR POLITICAL DIFFICULTY IN GETTING ADDITIONAL FUNDS APPROVED. THIS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY TRUE IF THE APPROACH HAD TO MADE IN THE RUN UP TO, OR SOON AFTER. THE FIRST DIRECT ELECTIONS TO THE COUNCIL IN SEPTEMBER 1991. INEVITABLY THERE
WOULD BE PRESSING DEMANDS FOR HMG TO PAY THE FULL ADDITIONAL COST.