SECRET

FM HONG KONG

SECRET

HKC 062/ 1

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY

31J AN 1990

Rog

Pa.

19/1

033336

MDLIAN 1705

TO PRIORITY FCO

DESK OFFICER

REGISTRY

TELNO 254

INDEX

PA

Action Taken

OF 19113OZ JANUART 90

FOR STONE HKD, FCO: YOUR TELELETTER OF 17 JANUARY 1990: ROYAL NAVY PRESENCE AFLOAT

1. THE OPERATIONAL CASE FOR RETAINING AN RN PRESENCE AFLOAT IN HONG

KONG TURNS TO SOME EXTENT ON THE LEVEL OF MARPOL RESOLVE, HOW THAT RESOLVE IS DEMONSTRATED AND HOW PERCEIVED BY THE PLA NAVY AND OTHER PRC UNITS OPERATING IN HONG KONG WATERS. WHILST MARPOL SHOULD

IN THEORY BE ABLE TO CATER FOR THE INSTANCES QUOTED IN PARA. 2 OF YOUR TELELETTER, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT MARPOL RESOLVE COULD EASILY WEAKEN IN THE FACE OF OVERTLY AGGRESSIVE CHINESE BEHAVIOUR, OR WHERE MARPOL WAS REQUIRED TO TAKE A ROBUST APPROACH AGAINST

PERCEIVED PRC INTERESTS.

2. SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES AS ABOVE ARE NOT (NOT) THEORETICAL. THUS, ON 16 JANUARY 1990 A CHINESE PATROL VESSEL (CPV) WAS SEEN ABOUT FIVE KILOMETRES INSIDE HK WATERS NEAR CHEUNG CHAU. THREE UNIFORMED MEN, AT LEAST ONE OF THEM ARMED, WERE SEEN TO BOARD A HK REGISTERED

FISHING VESSEL. BOTH THE CPV AND THE FISHING VESSEL THEN LEFT HK

WATERS WITH THE THREE CHINESE OFFICERS STILL ABOARD THE FISHING

VESSEL. THE CPV IGNORED INSTRUCTIONS FROM MARPOL TO STOP. WE HAVE

TAKEN UP THIS CASE WITH THE NCNA.

3. THE ABOVE INCIDENT IS NOT (NOT) UNUSUAL AND IS ONE OF A SERIES

OF BLATANT INCURSIONS INTO HONG KONG WATERS. A WORRYING FEATURE OF

SUCH INCURSIONS IS THE OPEN DISPLAY OF CONTEMPT FOR MARPOL VESSELS AND PERSONNEL. ADDITIONALLY, WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE DISPLAY AND USE BY CPVS OF WEAPONS, AND THE WIDER DEPLOYMENT IN HONG KONG WATERS OF PROVINCIAL (RATHER THAN MORE LOCALLY BASED) CPVS. HOWEVER, IN THE CASE OF RN VESSELS, CPVS HAVE ADOPTED A MUCH MORE RESTRAINED AND SIGNIFICANTLY LESS CONFRONTATIONAL APPROACH.

4. AS REGARDS THE QUERY IN PARA 3 OF YOUR TELELETTER, THE CONTENTS OF OUR PAPER REFLECT ONGOING DISCUSSIONS WITH HQBF: PARA 7 OF THAT PAPER IS ENDORSED BY HQBF. ALTHOUGH OUR FORMAL OVERALL THREAT ASSESSMENT HAS NOT CHANGED, NEVERTHELESS, AS NOTED IN PARA 7 ABOVE, SEA INCURSIONS NOW SEEM MORE LIKELY AND POTENTIALLY MORE

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