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on the Peacock Patrol Craft after 1991/92.
The Case for a continued Naval Presence
4.
When the case for a continued naval presence afloat was reviewed earlier this year, the Hong Kong Government argued strongly (with our support) that there was both an operational and a
political case for the retention of the three Peacock Patrol Craft
until 1997:
- The operational case rested on the fact that an appropriate and
credible Royal Navy capability was required to uphold Hong Kong's
territorial integrity and to counter a possible erosion of Hong
Kong's sea borders by Chinese vessels. In the view of HQBF Hong Kong, such incursions now seemed more likely and potentially more
confrontational than was the case when the Garrison Withdrawal Plan
was originally drawn up. As evidence of this they cited the
increasing number of incidents when Chinese patrol vessels had
ignored instructions from MARPOL to stop.
-
The political case rested on the Governor's assessment that in the
aftermath of the events of June 1989, the Hong Kong community needed
some reassurance from the continuing presence of the Royal Navy Patrol Craft as a visible sign of British Sovereignty. Early
withdrawal would undermine our efforts to demonstrate our commitment
to the territory and to promote confidence at a time when we were
doing all we could to bolster our authority in Hong Kong.
5. MOD officials accepted that there was a political case for
retaining the Royal Naval presence afloat. They also recognised
that although it might in theory be possible to replace the Peacocks
with cheaper, but less sophisticated Bird Class Patrol Craft (which
have a more limited ocean-going capability), such a decision would be difficult to present politically in Hong Hong. Notwithstanding the advice of Commander British Forces Hong Kong, MOD officials
continued to maintain that there had been no substantive change in
the military position since the Withdrawal Plan was drawn up and
that the military case in itself was therefore insufficiently strong to justify the retention of a Royal Navy presence. Consequently
they were reluctant to see this additional commitment displace other
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