X
CONFIDENTIAL
B: THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN HONG KONG
Х
11. Mr Paul said that Hong Kong needed to retain the
loyalty and motivation of its civil service up to 1997.
This was a precondition for a successful administration and
a smooth transition. This would not be possible without the
services of HMOCS members. The Police Force were assuming
increasing responsibilities in the run-up to 1997 and were heavily dependent on their large expatriate contingent.
Mr Shipley added that members of HMOCS were becoming
increasingly frustrated by the lack of a decision on an
issue to which HMG should be firmly committed. This had caused much discontent amongst the police in recent months.
There was also a very serious morale problem throughout the
civil service. Because HKG was losing a large number of local officers at present it was vital to keep HMOCS members in the police and administration. Mr Paul said that if
there was an exodus of expatriate police officers, the cohesion of the police force would suffer and the
maintenance of law and order would be threatened. The
Chinese would not tolerate a breakdown of law and order: it
could make them intervene directly to restore it. As a
result Hong Kong would lose the autonomy we had negotiated
for it in the Joint Declaration. Another scenario would be
that HMG would have to fill the gap with the British
Garrison at a substantial cost and at a time when HMG was
trying to run down the garrison.
12. Mr Rayson asked for clarification about the distinction
between HMOCS officers and other HKG civil servants.
Mr Shipley said that HKG made no distinction between HMOCS
officers and its other civil servants. The distinction was
made by HMG. Members of HMOCS were appointed by the
Secretary of State, and HMG recognised its special
obligations to them. Mr Rayson said that conditions of rather than pension profzction, service and pay, were the crucial incentives to retain
a >
said that membership of HMOCS provided an
staff. Mr Fifoot
JL6AAK/5
no better off
CONFIDENTIAL