States has argued that mandatory should not be implemented until all volunteers have been returned and the flow of new applications has dried up. The HKG's position, supported by HMG, is that without mandatory repatriation the purpose of the CPA will be frustrated. If the problem is to be brought under control, is essential that all elements of the CPA be implemented.
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it
It is impossible to predict with any certainty the rate of arrivals in 1990.
Needless to say another influx of arrivals would put the Administration under great pressure. The immediate issue is how best to head off a major influx during the summer of 1990.
There are, with a number of variations, two broad strategies.
Rapid Screening and Repatriation
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If the full deterrent message of the CPA is to reach potential boat people in Vietnam, it is essential that the repatriation of non-refugees takes place quickly. Under present procedures, it will take about two years to complete screening and review for the existing population. Our procedures are fast and efficient, but the scale of the problem means that people have to wait far too long in the camps before their status is settled. While in the camps their resolve to resist repatriation is strengthened by peer group pressure.
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centres.
The deterrent message could be strengthened by switching some screening and review resources to the initial reception The objective would be to focus on the rapid screening of new arrivals, while continuing with the screening of those already here. Under existing legislation we could screen and complete reviews for new arrivals in about six weeks.
The time taken to come to a final decision on status could be shortened if the statutory period of 28 days allowed for the preparation of representations prior to consideration by the Review Boards was shortened. There is however already criticism from the UNHCR, repeated by Amnesty International, that a period of 28 days is insufficient. Such criticism would have more substance if the period were to be reduced.
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An essential element of this approach is that those screened out soon after arrival must be returned quickly to Vietnam.
If the arrival rate is low it might be possible to continue to return people by air. However, contingency plans have been made to establish a repatriation programme by sea. The objective would be to screen all new arrivals quickly at the Green Island reception centre and return the screened out each week to Haiphong, in groups of about 400 per voyage. this way the deterrent message would be strengthened by making it more immediate. The difficulties of repatriation would be considerably reduced because we would be dealing with people
In
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