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5. A third idea is described in our telno 949 to Hong Kong. In essence, this seeks to overcome our difficulties with the Vietnamese over the use of force by an agreement with the Chinese to repatriate non-refugees across South China, following the routes by which they came, with the Chinese putting them across the land border into DEF Vietnam. Peking, Hong Kong, Hanoi and Washington have all commented on the idea. Posts in the East believe it is at least of some tactical value, if only to test the limits of Chinese willingness to help; Washington has reservations because of the hostility that could be aroused in the United States to any such proposal. Peking have queried whether such an arrangement would in practice overcome Vietnamese objections in the use of force. Hong Kong agree that if we were to make such a proposal, it might best be put to the Chinese in the first instance by the Political Adviser, to the
NCNA.
7. We have a choice on timing. We could seize the present opportunity and raise these ideas once we have digested the outcome of the Manila meeting. Alternatively we could keep an approach up our sleeves to deploy if the situation worsens in Hong Kong. Although the number of new arrivals in Hong Kong continues at a low level, we may face a major difficulty in two or three months' time if the supply of volunteers dries up and we have not reached an agreement, either international or bilateral with the Vietnamese, on mandatory repatriation. If that happened, we should want to have looked at possible alternatives, including the possibility of repatriation through China. Bearing in mind that any arrangements with the Chinese will probably take considerable time to work out, it would be worth broaching the idea with the Chinese sooner rather than later. I recommend therefore that we should aim to do so initially, at Political Adviser level in Hong Kong. We can then consider whether to pursue the ideas further in Peking in the light of initial Chinese reactions and other developments on mandatory repatriation. But we should make it clear to the Chinese that we were now seeking their active assistance on the implementation of two aspects of the CPA, to which they had subscribed: namely the discouragement of clandestine departures and the repatriation of non-refugees.