n
S.
*
1103
Hong
| 24 JANUARY 1990 ]
the poverty in which they find themselves. Thus one wouluppose that it was in our interests to do what
A to dimish * povky of Victrum milich has been brought about by the policies of the Government, by the effects of war, and by the aid embargo which we have imposed on that wretched country. It seems folly in the circumstances in which we are struggling with this flood of refugees who impose themselves on Hong Kong, that we should maintain this aid embargo. I hope that at the conference a further agreement was reached with the assent of the United States that the aid embargo would be abandoned forthwith. If it was not, I think that this country should abandon it unilaterally.
Secondly, arrangements should be made and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees should be helped to disseminate information within Vietnam, to stem the exodus, to discourage people from going to Hong Kong. On this I should have thought we should engage the co-operation of the Vietnamese Government as one of the quid pro quos for resuming aid. I also hope that the BBC's external. services and other broadcasting organisations should collaborate. That seems to me about all I can say on the subject at present.
The settlement of the situation in Hong Kong must depend and fall finally as a responsibility on the United Kingdom, Hong Kong and China. Since the terrible events at Tiananmen square this summer, the Government of the Chinese People's Republic, driven by fear and insecurity-and we know that fear is always a bad adviser-far from relaxing their internal or external policy, have done neither.
If we look at the internal manifestations of the Government's policy, we thought—and it was presented as such-that it was a relaxation when martial law was lifted. However, it did not show much signs of being a relaxation. When martial law was lifted, there was no suggestion that the 150,000 troops in Beijing and around it would be withdrawn. They are still there. It was reported in a Hong Kong newspaper that 40,000 of the troops had simply changed out of military uniform into the uniform of paramilitary police. At the same time, a new municipal law was published banning strikes and demonstrations. Therefore, I have seen little sign therefore of relaxation in the internal policy.
As to their posture towards Hong Kong itself, it has unquestionably hardened. In July, the Chinese Government insisted that Chinese troops should be stationed in Hong Kong after 1997. At the Commonwealth Conference they objected to what they called the "internationalisation" of Hong Kong. Since then they have demanded that the pace of democratisation should be modified. More recently, they have suggested the introduction of a two-tier legislature. Only 15 per cent. of those elected should have the right of abode abroad. More recently still, they have objected to the package of 20th December.
The question which we must face is: how do we respond? The answer is that of course we have to continue to negotiate with the Chinese People's Republic, no matter how intransigent it appears, because we hold cards much stronger in the
Kong
1104
negotiating position than is sometimes represented. It is our duty to try to persuade it of this. Further, ve New to pl de them that Us policy is not appeasement. The idea is prevalent in some quarters and was given plausibility, I regret to say, by the secret visit of Sir Percy Cradock, the Prime Minister's personal foreign policy adviser, to Beijing. That was a most unfortunate venture in personal diplomacy. It was widely interpreted as going behind the back of the Foreign Office and a sign of weakness.
The criterion by which British policy must be judged is whether or not it increases the confidence of the people of Hong Kong. Does it or does it not encourage them to stay put? Does it help to reduce the haemorrhage of emigration which is running now at about 1,000 people a week? Although they are by no means the only bargaining counter we have, our strongest bargaining counter must be the skills and talents of the people of Hong Kong. Therefore it is important that we do everything in our power to stem that flow of emigration. If one applies that criterion to democratisation or to a Bill of Rights, we should support the OMELCO proposals for hastening democratisation simply because that is the consensual view of the people who are most important to the prosperity of Hong Kong. They are the people who make Hong Kong so fundamentally important to China. I support a Bill of Rights not. only because the former Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, pledged himself to it in July of 1989, but also because it is the view of those who live in Hong Kong that it is desirable for itself and as a confidence building measure.
On the question of passports let us apply the same criterion. We must ask ourselves whether the December package of 50,000 families or 225,000 people covered by it which Mr. Tebbit so strongly objects to and which has also caused confusion in other quarters is sufficient as a confidence-building measure. I say in all seriousness that the way we should decide the answer to that question is whether that number is sufficient to act as a trigger to mobilise international co-operation in an effort to increase that number.
I have said from the beginning that I believe we should try to mobilise our friends in the European Community, in the Commonwealth and in the United States to collaborate with us in providing a place of abode, in the event of the worst possible case occurring, to the population of British citizens. in Hong Kong. The question we have to answer is whether our December package is big enough to persuade them. I ask most urgently that the Government call at the earliest possible moment a meeting of our colleagues in the European Community, in the Commonwealth and in the United States so that they can help in assuring the future of those people for whom we have a specia! responsibility. Such an international effort makes the problem facing us much more manageable. It would also provide the kind of confidence that would stem the haemorrhage and would increase the pressure on the CPR to act in the spirit of the joint declaration and in the idea of one nation, two systems.