し
SECRET UK EYES A
The military response
4. An effective military defence against a full-scale Chinese invasion is therefore unrealistic (and is certainly not anticipated), without enormous reinforcement of the garrison.
We would doubtless conduct a delaying action using the high ground to the North of Kowloon, but no specific plans exist for this; our worst-case scenario envisages major internal disorder coupled with an external threat, and the current concept of operations (set out in CBF's Operational Instructions) is designed to be highly flexible, with our land forces left largely uncommitted at the outset. The aim is to ensure a rapid and effective response to outbreaks of internal disorder.
5.
Reinforcement plans (') do exist to supplement the garrison, but these are also based on countering an internal threat. We would hope to be able to deploy CBF's acclimatised in-theatre reserve (the Gurkha battalion in Brunei) within 72 hours (although this unit would normally be at 7 days' notice to move), but the speed of deployment would depend on the availability of air transport. Reinforcement of the garrison while Chinese aggression was under way would not be viable.
Degree of warning
6.
The threat in Hong Kong is assessed by the garrison using an elaborate series of warning signs and indicators. But it is quite likely that we would receive almost no warning of an imminent Chinese attack. A characteristic of PLA operations is their emphasis on preplanning, with little need (or ability, because of a lack of communications equipment) for preliminary radio traffic. The PLA almost certainly has a contingency plan for intervention in Hong Kong.
7.
We would presumably receive US intelligence on any substantial troop movements in the region. But the Chinese probably have sufficient forces in the vicinity of the colony (in particular the PAP presence in Shenzhen) to remove the need for large-scale movements before an operation.
Summary
A serious Chinese incursion is most unlikely. It would be against China's own interests, and is only likely to be prompted by a total breakdown of law and order in Hong Kong.
8.
1
JTP 30 (latest revise January 1990), held by the FCO. This earmarks up to six infantry battalions and two brigade headquarters to the reinforcement of Hong Kong.
SECRET UK EYES A