CONFIDENTIAL
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MDHOAN 2288
ABSENCE OF HOSTILE STATEMENTS FROM CHINA AND A PERIOD OF QUIET IN WHICH MATTERS COULD BE SORTED OUT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW THE CANADIAN DELEGATION GOT ON.
EAST GERMANY
7.
MACDONALD'S MAIN QUESTION CONCERNED TIMING. WHEN SHOULD WE TRY TO HELP THE EAST GERMANS? SHOULD WE DO IT NOW OR WAIT FOR THE DUST TO SETTLE? THE SECRETARY OF STATE RECALLED THAT THE EC HAD STARTED NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT. WE THOUGHT A LIMITED AGREEMENT WAS RIGHT. HE HAD THE IMPRESSION OF A COUNTRY IN CONSIDERABLE CRISIS. EVENTS HAD ACCELERATED OVER THE LAST TEN DAYS AND WERE MOVING VERY FAST INDEED. MODROW SEEMED DECENT BUT EXHAUSTED. HE HAD GIVEN A VERY PESSIMISTIC VIEW, WHICH HE HAD NOW REPEATED IN PUBLIC. THE ODDS WERE THAT THE GDR WOULD GET THROUGH TO ELECTIONS WITH A VERY UNTIDY SYSTEM. WE SHOULD DO WHAT WE COULD TO HELP IN OUR DIFFERENT WAYS: THERE WAS A LOT TO BE SAID FOR NOT HAVING THE FRG DO IT ALL. WE HAD OFFERED HELP FROM OUR QUOTE KNOW-HOW UNQUOTE FUND WITH PROJECTS LIKE THE CENTRAL BANK, DRAFTING A LAW TO HELP EAST GERMANY ADHERE TO GATT ETC. WE WERE PUTTING A TOE IN THE WATER TO SHOW THAT WE WERE INTERESTED. WE WOULD WAIT BEFORE DOING ANYTHING MORE
SUBSTANTIAL.
NATO AND US/CANADIAN FORCES IN EUROPE
8.
THE PACE OF EVENTS ALSO MEANT THAT WE NEEDED TO SORT OUT OUR IDEAS IN NATO FAIRLY SOON. IN REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S QUESTION, MACDONALD SAID THAT THE CANADIANS, WITH 7,500 PERSONNEL IN EUROPE, WERE VIRTUALLY DOWN TO THEIR MINIMUM LEVEL. ALTHOUGH IN CANADA A VOCAL MINORITY REMAINED CRITICAL OF ANY CANADIAN PRESENCE IN EUROPE, HE DID NOT SEE THIS AS A MAJOR POLITICAL ISSUE AT PRESENT: THE GOVERNMENT WERE NOT UNDER PRESSURE TO REDUCE. THE QUESTIONS WERE RATHER MORE LONG TERM. WHERE WAS ALL THIS CHANGE LEADING? WAS THERE STILL A ROLE FOR CANADA IN EUROPE (WHEN DR OWEN SAID THAT THE US AND CANADA SHOULD GO HOME)? WHAT PRECISELY WAS THE ROLE OF THE NORTH AMERICANS IN THE FUTURE?
9.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID AND HE KNEW THAT THE PRIME MINISTER FELT THIS WAY TOO THAT A NORTH AMERICAN PRESENCE IN EUROPE WAS TERRIBLY IMPORTANT. IT WAS A MAJOR STABILISING FACTOR: ONE ONLY HAD TO COMPARE THE SITUATIONS AFTER THE FIRST AND SECOND WORLD WARS. SECONDLY, IT WAS IMPORTANT IN HANDLING THE GERMAN QUESTION: THE PRESERVATION OF A NORTH AMERICAN PRESENCE IN NATO WAS A WAY OF ANCHORING A UNITED GERMANY. ASPECTS WERE IMPORTANT TO EUROPEANS AND, HE THOUGHT, CANADA.
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