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Soviet Union, China and their clients on the same wavelength. would make a difference that the Group would now have the benefit of the UN Fact Finding Mission's report. Hitherto the P5 had known nothing about what civil structures existed in Cambodia. There was a further meeting down for end June in Paris but this timing was likely to be too optimistic. The four parties might be around in the wings at that meeting which would enable the P5 to bring pressure on them.
5. The Secretary of State asked about attitudes in ASEAN. Senator Evans said Singapore had recently been less strident and was anyway not a significant problem. Alatas had lately been less active. He was increasingly turning his attention to the UN resolution. He had got his hands burnt at Jakarta. That process would have to start over again. The Secretary of State remarked that that must be right. Senator Evans added that the Thais were the hardest to read. Chavalit had a foot in each camp.
6. Senator Evans asked what The Twelve were doing about the problem of the UN seat. The Secretary of State said that at Ministerial level they had progressed beyond thinking that they could do nothing again. Mr McLaren said that at official level it was now accepted that the present situation could not be allowed to continue. A warning had been given to the P5 that things could not be left as they were. Thought was being given to the possibility of pressing for the Supreme National Council to have the seat. But it might well be that not enough progress could be made on this by the autumn. In which case the other thought was to have an empty seat. The next Asia Working Group meeting would discuss the subject. Responding to a question, Senator Evans said that domestically he was having to duck and weave on this issue, because it was necessary for Australia to be seen to be even handed. But if The Twelve were to give a lead Australia would support. The Secretary of State said it was time to discuss the problem in The Twelve. He would explore this with M. Dumas at the informal weekend in Co. Kerry on 19/20 May.
7.
Commenting on the situation on the ground, Senator Evans said it was clear to Australia that the US assessments were completely "cockeyed". The Americans greatly overestimated the strength of the Khmer Rouge. The proof was that Hun Sen was back in 95% control. The fact was no one had made headway. He urged caution in evaluating US military intelligence.
8.
Later on in the conversation, when it had moved to another subject, Senator Evans commented, à propos of the problems posed by Indo Chinese refugees, that this was one of the reasons why pressure for a Cambodian settlement should be maintained. Mr McLaren agreed, and said the UK had had some reservations about the standstill proposal because it considered it important to keep pressure on the four parties and on the Soviet Union and China. There was a risk that a standstill would take the pressure off. Senator Evans replied that the Australian proposal was carefully designed not to take pressure off. It deliberately did not give the Vietnamese and the Cambodian regime what they wanted. The idea of a standstill was
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