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09 APR 1990
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From:
Marsden Date:
HKD
this he he Jones
M Seali
E J Field
23 February 1990
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LUNCH FOR MR KUBOTA, JAPANESE CONSUL-GENERAL IN HONG KONG
1.
You asked me to record the main points made by Mr Kubota, the newly appointed Japanese Consul-General, Hong Kong, and Mr Otsuka, Deputy Director General, Asian Affairs Bureau, MFA at your lunch on 22 February.
2. Mr Kubota had just returned from 15 months in Beijing, prior to which he had been in the Economic Cooperation Bureau of the MFA. Much of his career has been spent in dealing with Asian matters. The lunch gave you the opportunity of thanking the Japanese for their support for Hong Kong in particular the Foreign Minister's visit – and on the question of repatriating Vietnamese boat people. The importance of continuing Japanese support in both cases was underlined.
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3. In the course of the conversation Mr Kubota made the following points:-
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1) Japanese interest in Hong Kong remained strong. Japanese companies were still investing. The MFA's impression was that this was increasing;
2) China fundamentally understood the need to maintain foreign confidence in Hong Kong. The tough stance taken in the recent negotiations on the Basic Law was probably a negotiating ploy. You commented that this had been counter- productive as Chinese toughness seemed to be undermining foreign confidence;
He
3) from his experience in Beijing Mr Kubota concluded that the need for economic reform was generally accepted by Chinese leaders. This was one reason why, for instance, they had been reluctant to move against the students. also thought that senior Chinese were becoming more aware of the need to maintain foreign confidence, despite the fact that their current actions did not always support this interpretation;
4) as far as the Third Yen Loan was concerned Japan would be very cautious. Much work would have to be done before most of the projects could be initiated. In most cases feasibility studies had not even been carried out;
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