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4.
On (a), it is
of course correct that at some stage Hong
Kong will have to amend the relevant local laws to take
account of BL 51. However, Hong Kong will also have to amend all relevant laws so that they conform with the Basic
Law.
It would look most peculiar indeed to pluck this one
out for special early treatment. As Hong Kong telno 3464 indicates in paragraph 5, such a move at this time just as we are introducing the first directly elected seats and | 2
trumpeting Hong Kong's autonomy and our wish to see as much
freedom for the Legislative Council as possible, would sit
most peculiarly and most controversially.
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13
ļ
we can
always do
from here.
5. As regards (b), I cannot really see the advantage in
giving the Governor these powers. HMG will retain sufficient power to bring legislation into force in Hong Kong without the assent of the Legislative Council by Order In Council. It is not therefore a case of LegCo being
able to stop HMG taking whatever action it considered
appropriate. It thus comes down to a judgement as to whether in the circumstances of a hostile LegCo it is better 21
for the Governor to exercise these powers or for HMG to
exercise these powers. Given that the Governor is seen to be and is the Queen's representative in Hong Kong, I do not
see that there is any material (political) difference in
these two approaches. The argument that direct rule from
London could lead to similar direct rule from Peking in
similar circumstances no longer stands up, because the Basic
Law does not provide for it unless the Chinese envoke
Article 18.
Colonial Laws Validity Act
6.
On the Colonial Laws Validity Act, the relevant part of Section 5 provides that "every representative legislature
shall ..... have
full power to make laws respecting the
constitution, powers and procedure of such legislature;
provided that such laws shall have been passed in such
manner and form as may from time to time be required by any
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