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CONFIDENTIAL
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I enclose a transcript of Dame Lydia's comments to the Press after the meeting.
Redacted under FOI Exemptions Sec 40, 27(1)(a)(c)(d)
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J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
(C. D. POWELL)
CONFIDENTIAL
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If
HONG KONG: CONSEQUENCES OF CONFRONTATION
we reject the Chinese offer and impose our own electoral arrangements pre-1997 regardless of the Basic Law the following are the likely consequences:
(a) The Chinese would make public that we had rejected their cooperation and that, regardless of what
we did pre-1997, they
would impose their own
arrangements after 1997.
These could well be more
restrictive than in their latest offer to us.
(b)
(c)
They would go ahead with their own plans post-1997 without taking account of our interests. They would make clear that there would have to be
elections in 1997 at the time of the hand-over,
ie an abrupt break. We would lose the
the "through train" understanding whereby LEGCO members elected in 1995 could sit through the transition. The
Chinese might announce
a preparatory committee
to prepare for these new 1997 elections and could
start making early and obvious moves for a new
government of the
the Special Administrative Region, ie a shadow government waiting in the wings.
They would withdraw cooperation from us on other issues concerning Hong Kong. They would claim
we had broken the Joint Declaration and their
commitment to it, or at least those parts they do not like, would weaken. They would justify any such departures by reference to alleged British
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(d)
(e)
failure to adhere to its terms. They could
retaliate directly in other ways, eg Hong Kong immigrants.
They would probably let it be known in Hong Kong
that any political figure cooperating with the
British in the legislature would be persona non grata after 1997. This would deter many responsible people from having anything to do with it.
We could expect a general barrage of hostile
propaganda from Peking. The crisis atmosphere
would lead to widespread apathy among ordinary
people about the legislature and It would probably result in an extremely
Hong Kong
elections.
low turn out.
(f)
In the circumstances it is doubtful whether we
should be able
able to raise international finance for
the port and airport development strategy
strategy which
we have introduced specifically in order to restore
confidence. Our inability to proceed with these
schemes would have disastrous effects on confidence.
(g) More generally, it would become impossible to build up any relationship of trust between Peking and the future authorities in Hong Kong, ie the only
scenario in which there
there is a reasonable prospect of the Chinese refraining from interference in
post-1997 Hong Kong. We would be seen to be backing
a group of people whose driving philosophy was opposition to China and who could not possibly survive in power after 1997. Many of those in
Hong Kong who are now urging us towards the more
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