iv) concern was expressed that the power of interpretation of the Basic Law by the NPC Standing Committee as stipulated in the first draft was too wide. It stated that before passing final judgement, the SAR Courts would be required to seek an interpretation from the Standing Committee whenever a case involved an interpretation of a provision outside the SAR's autonomy.
In the second draft, the NPC Standing Committee delegates to the SAR Courts the power to interpret provisions which are within the limits of Hong Kong's autonomy. The SAR Courts will refer to the Standing Committee only when in their view an interpretation by the Standing Committee of a provision outside the SAR's autonomy is required (not involved) for a final judgement to be made.
v) concern was expressed that the scope of "acts designed to undermine national unity or subvert the CPG" in the first draft was capable of being interpreted very widely. This entailed the
potential risk of undermining the high degree of autonomy to be enjoyed by the Hong Kong SAR.
In the second draft, there is a more precise and familiar formulation of such acts ("acts of treason, secession, sedition and the theft of state secrets").
vi)
the first draft was criticised for providing inadequate protection of human rights, since the SAR legislature would in theory be able to enact laws to restrict human rights beyond the limits permissible under the two relevant international Covenants.
In the second draft, it is clearly stipulated that restrictions on rights and freedoms must not contravene the Covenants as applied to Hong Kong.
vii) in the section on the political structure in the first draft, arrangements were envisaged whereby there would be a clear break in the membership of the legislature in 1997. Concern was expressed that this would jeopardise continuity and a smooth transition in 1997 and could affect local and international confidence.
MO PAAD 10