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GUARANTEES HAS BEEN OBTAINED.
3.
ON THE RHC PROPOSAL DE MELLO SAID UNHCR WAS CONCERNED THAT SCHEMES OF THIS KIND MIGHT SET UNDESIRABLE PRECENDENTS FOR REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. THERE WAS A RISK THAT ULTIMATELY RHCS MIGHT BE USED TO DETAIN REFUGEES EVERYWHERE. THE UNHCR DID NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WAS APPROPRIATE FOR THEM TO RUN AN RHC. BUT ICM MIGHT BE PREPARED TO DO SO. UNHCR WERE ALSO CONCERNED THAT AN RHC MIGHT REDUCE PRESSURE ON VIETNAM TO TAKE BACK THOSE FOR
WHOM IT SHOULD REMAIN RESPONSIBLE.
B
4 I EXPLAINED THAT WE NOW FACED A CRISIS WHICH NECESSITATED URGENT ACTION. REPATRIATION WAS PART OF A PACKAGE. FIRST ASYLUM WOULD COME UNDER IMMENSE PRESSURE HERE IF THE PACKAGE AS A WHILE WAS NOT IMPLEMENTED. OUR EXPERIENCE WITH VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION WAS THAT ONLY VERY SMALL NUMBERS WERE, OR WERE LIKELY TO BE, INTERESTED.
WE
DID NOT HAVE THE LUXURY OF ALLOWING A LONG TOME TO SEE IF VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION WOULD WORK WHEN (A) EXPERIENCE SHOWED IT WOULD NOT AND (B) THE INFLUX CONTINUED AT ITS PRESENT RATE.
5.
HIS
DE MELLO SPECULATED THAT VIETNAMESE ATTITUDES MIGHT CHANGE.
OWN CONATCTS WITH VIETNAM SUGGESTED THAT THERE WERE DIFFERENCES IN THE LEADERSHIP OVER THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE SRV SHOULD CO-OPERATE
EVEN ON VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION. HE BELIEVED THAT THERE WERE RISKS THAT IF WE PRESSED TOO HARD ON REPATRIATION WE WOULD LOSE WHAT WE HAD ALREADY ACHIEVED. I SAID THAT I APPRECIATED HIS POINTS ABOUT VIETNAMESE POLITICS. BUT WE ALSO FACED POLITICAL PRESSURES OF OUR OWN. IF WE WERE DISCUSSING THIS SUBJECT THREE YEARS AGO I COULD OFFER UNHCR TIME TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE VIETNAMESE. BUT THREE YEARS LATER FIRST ASYLUM WAS NOW UNDER REAL PRESSURE. I HOPED THAT, AS HAD BEEN THE CASE IN 1979, THE VIETNAMESE AT GENEVA WOULD FIND THEMSELVES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPOTLIGHT AND MIGHT THEN BE PREVAILED UPON TO TAKE BETTER MEASURES TO CONTROL THE OUTFLOW: SUCH A REDUCTION IN OUTFLOW WAS NOW VITAL. I ALSO HOPED THAT UNHCR WOULD PURSUE VIGOROUSLY THE RHC CONCEPT. IF IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY AFTER GENEVA THIS WOULD AT LEAST GIVE US A BREATHING SPACE IN
PRACTICAL AND POLITICAL TERMS.
6.
IN CONCLUSION I BRIEFED DE MELLO (FOR HIS PERSONAL INFORMATION
ONLY) ON OUR THOUGHTS ABOUT A SOUTH CHINA HOLDING CENTRE. I STRESSED THAT THIS WAS AN IDEA WHICH WE WERE STILL DISCUSSING WITH YOU AND WHICH AD NOT/NOT BEEN PUT TO THE CHINESE. HOWEVER HE WOULD WISH TO BE AWARE OF OUR THINKING AND OF THE VIGOUR WITH WHICH WE WERE NOW
PURSUING ALL POSSIBLE OPTIONS FOR RESOLVING OUR PRESENT PROBLEMS.
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