CONFIDENTIAL
A
K
(c)
Mandatory repatriation.
This remains by
far the most difficult area. The presentational, political and other problems are referred to in the submission and Mr Brenton's minute of 12 April. I do not underestimate them, but, as Mr Paul points out, the whole logic of the screening policy is that those screened out must be returned to their country of origin as illegal immigrants sooner or later, whether they want to return or not. It would be very much easier if there were a regular flow of voluntary departures, but that has not happened so far, and no one really believes that significant numbers of people will volunteer until they are convinced that there is no alternative.
Mandatory repatriation will not be practicable until the Vietnam Government is prepared to accept it. We clearly do not want to alienate UNHCR or the Americans. But I submit that we need at least to work for agreement at the Conference that, if a reasonable flow of voluntary returns has not been established within an agreed timescale (say six months), alternatives will be considered, and that those alternatives must include mandatory repatriation under suitable safeguards as well as transfer to a regional holding centre.
The Secretary of State will wish to consider Lord Glenarthur's comments on the Governor's proposals sent from Jakarta (Jakarta Telno 183). He may think it would be useful to hold an office meeting to decide on the way forward after Lord Glenarthur's return from Vietnam.
12 April 1989
Cc:
PS/Lord Glenarthur
PS/Mr Eggar
Mr Gillmore
Mr Slater
Mr Thomas,
SEAD
Mr Brenton, UND
Mr Millington, FED
Mr Paul, HKD
CONFIDENTIAL
R JT McLaren