From:
RP HATFIELD
Redacted under FOI exemption 27(1)
1
SECRET
UK EYES A
Head of Secretariat (Overseas) (Commitments)
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Main Building, Whitehall, London SW1A 2H8
Telephone (Direct Dialling) 01-218 6144
(Switchboard) 01-218 9000
222 Who to me pls
Alan Paul Esq
Head of Hong Kong Department Foreign and Commonwealth
London
SW1
D/Sec(0)(C)/6/7
19 September 1989
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Сс
Mestme
pl draft
22/9
(dismas foror)
THE FUTURE OF THE RN PResence aFLOAT IN HONG KONG
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2.
As we have made clear, we do not interpret this as a commitment to maintain a naval presence afloat after March 1992 when, in accordance with the outline withdrawal plan, it is intended to withdraw the three remaining Peacock class patrol craft from Hong Kong. Accordingly, no financial provision exists for a commitment beyond then and any changes to the outline withdrawal plan would need to be referred to Ministers. Although a continued RN presence afloat in Hong Kong could assist in demonstrating sovereignty, on the basis of current and envisaged circumstances, the military case for retention is weak and insufficient for the MOD to justify retention of RN forces afloat once the MARPOL capability has been developed. The case for retention rests therefore principally on wider foreign policy considerations.
3. It is against this background that MOD has considered the most suitable and cost-effective naval force should it be decided for political reasons to retain one. To guarantee that one vessel would be available at all times, three would need to be stationed there, (though the political requirement might be met by a smaller force). Our preliminary conclusion on the type of ship is that the Peacock class patrol vessels may be over-sophisticated for the likely range of tasks that a residual Naval force might carry out. On the other hand, there may be some presentational advantages in preserving continuity if an
SECRET
UK EYES A