SECRET UK EYES A
resort, offer a theatre nuclear option. The layered air defences envisaged in the NATO context may well be incomplete OOA, which will emphasize the need for ships to carry self- defence MAAW systems, including means of warning, hard-kill and passive protection. As noted in the MWOC (22), a larger calibre gun could contribute to this, as well as to ASUW and land attack. Although the majority of threats are likely to be above-water, mining represents a highly cost-effective tactic for a nation seeking to effect sea-denial in appropriate areas and seems likely to demand a greater degree of attention than is currently the case in-area.
43.
Maritime Force Packages. The emphasis is likely to be on surface platforms, and the variety and scale of possible maritime tasks may require force levels ranging from a single ship to balanced task forces. Bearing in mind the potential importance of amphibious capabilities and organic air power, key elements of such forces are likely to be CVSG, LPH and ASS. STUFT will remain necessary for the support of prolonged major operations, and reduction in the availability of some categories of British-registered merchant ships will oblige the UK to rely increasingly on foreign charter.
44. Land Capabilities. The number of overseas garrisons are being reduced in line with reducing commitments and resource levels (23). This may increase the risk of aggression or interference towards remaining UK dependencies and areas of national interest. There will thus be a continuing need to be able to reinforce these areas quickly and effectively with a balanced intervention force of a size appropriate to the threat. This capability, demonstrated by regular exercising, must provide an effective deterrent to potential aggressors.
22 CDS 21/89.
23 CDS 38/88 - OOA Strategy Review.
mb.1s2
22
UK EYES A SECRET