SECRET UK EYES A
35. The BM Factor. A further consideration will be the
potential BM threat, both to British territory and, to the UK
itself from OOA. In the unlikely event of such a system having a nuclear warhead a capability to respond in kind
should serve to deter the rational. If CW or BW were to be
involved a response would probably depend on the scale of the threat. If mass casualties were in prospect the nuclear deterrent option might be deemed appropriate, while in less
extreme circumstances the threat of swift conventional
retaliation should suffice. If deterrence were to fail and in
the absence of effective ABM defences the only defence against such BM systems would be to destroy them at source. This would require long-range weapon delivery systems or, if clandestine methods were preferable, SF.
FORCE STRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
36. The forces structures considered below will be geared
primarily to the demands of limited war, since it is here that
capabilities are liable to be most critical for success.
Overall both capabilities and structures are assumed to
conform to those postulated in relevant Concept Papers (17) (18) (19) (20) (21), and will reflect the primary requirements of the UK's membership of NATO. OOA needs are
therefore considered in that context, noting differences of emphasis and stressing aspects which may be of particular importance OOA. Although almost all UK operations OOA will
17CDS 37/88
- An Operational Sub-Concept for Land Defence of the UK 1998-2013.
18 CDS 8/89 - An Operational Concept for the UK Contribution to the Defence of the Northern Region of ACE.
19
'CDS 12/89 - An Operational Concept for the UK Land/Air Contribution to the Central Region of ACE.
20CDS 21/89 - An Operational Concept for Maritime Warfare for the UK 1998-2013.
'CDS 26/89 - An Operational Sub-Concept for the Air Defence of
the UK 1998-2013.
mb.1s2
18
UK EYES A SECRET