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001
MDHIAN
THIRDLY, CHINESE REACTIONS.
THERE IS A CONTRADICTION BETWEEN WHAT IS RIGHTLY SAID AT THE END OF PARA 5 OF SECOND T U R ABOUT THE HARDENING OF MILITARY ATTITUDES, AND THE PICTURE OF CHINESE REASONABLENESS PAINTED IN PARA 9. SOME CHINESE WILL INDEED APPRECIATE THE ARGUMENTS ABOUT CONFIDENCE AND THE LONG-TERM BENEFITS TO THE P R C. BUT THEY ARE NOT THE ONES CALLING THE SHOTS AT PRESENT. THERE IS EVERY INDICATION THAT FOLLOWING THE EVENTS OF 4 JUNE THE LEADERSHIP WILL UPHOLD THE VIEWS OF THE ARMED FORCES EVEN MORE STRONGLY THAN BEFORE.
ONCE THE CHINESE HAVE
PLAYED THE ''SOVEREIGNTY CARD AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS, IT WILL BE A VERY LENGTHY AND DIFFICULT PROCESS TO SHIFT THEM FROM IT. OUR CHANCES WILL BE EVEN MORE REMOTE IF WE PROVOKE THEM ON ANY PRACTICAL ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM NOW.
5.
AS FOR POSSIBLE FORMS OF RETALIATION, IT IS TRUE THAT THE CHINESE ROLE IN THE JLG HAS BEEN LARGELY PASSIVE (PARA 9(C)). BUT I SEE THE IMPLICATION PRECISELY THE OTHER WAY. IT IS WE WHO KNOW HOW MUCH WORK NEEDS TO BE DONE TO KEEP HONG KONG FUNCTIONING PROPERLY AND HONG KONG WHICH HAS THE VITAL INTEREST IN GETTING IT DONE. ALL THE CHINESE NEED TO DO IS DIG THEIR HEELS IN. ALL THEY
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