SECRET UK EYES A LOCSEN
in LOH should be effected. The second, equally important aim was to identify the costs - in terms of finance and manpower
-
of maintaining 2 IRR SCOUTS at unit level (i.e. at Sek
Kong under the control of 660 Sqn AAC) So that this information could be incorporated in a bid for LTC funding
some other source of funding post 1989, assuming that
the trial showed the force level mix to be feasible.
29. Having given the background, the Secretary indicated
that answers to 2 questions were required. First, CBF was
asked to advise what timescale HQBFHK would judge to be
realistic and sensible as a reaction time for the no-notice
generation of IRR SCOUTS for exercise purposes in the light of the perceived threat of
threat of spontaneous internal
instability in Hong Kong. The Secretary added that the HQ
had responded to a signal sent by MODUK the previous night
and had recommended a period of not less than 18 hours -
assuming the IRR SCOUTS were stored in 660 Sqn's own hangar
at Sek Kong - and not more than 24 hours if the aircraft
were stored elsewhere at Sek Kong. CBF confirmed that this
realistic generation period. The Committee decided
that a period of between 18 and 24 hours should be established as the requisite target for generation of IRR aircraft from stored to operational condition both for real and for exercise purposes.
was
→
30. The Secretary indicated that the second aspect which
required confirmation, this by RP (Army), was whether or not
notification by HQ BFHK of the results of the trial by end
Oct 89 would allow sufficient time for the preparation and submission of a bid for LTC funding provision or for some alternative financial arrangement such that the SCOUT force mix under evaluation could be retained beyond 1989 if
the trial had proved that it was practicable. In the absence of RP (Army), Col MO1 indicated that the Army Department
would welcome the results of
of the trial as soon as was
possible. The Committee's full endorsement of this judgement
LOCSEN
SECRET UK EYES A