12.
SECRET UK EYES A
Conversely, I was left in no doubt that the poor performance of the WS 423 radar programme was causing serious concern both to the ROK prime contractor (Samsung) and the Ministry of National Defence. I made it clear that this equipment was not in service with the UK Armed Forces and that their prime contractor must, at the end of the day, have made a judgement on and accepted the contractual risks of systems integration and performance. Whilst not disputing the contractual position, there is clearly a widespread feeling that UK equipment is not performing satisfactorily and is therefore the basic cause of the problem. This programme could therefore become a test case for future UK equipment opportunities in the ROK and I recommend that appropriate efforts be made to resolve the outstanding difficulties as soon as possible.
13. Overall, I felt that our Defence Attache (Brig D A Williams) and the relatively new 2nd Sec Defence Supply (Mr Peter Guest) were working well as a team. The DA has much wider
responsibilities, including his UNC/MAC commitments, but he also has a key part to play in explaining and supporting the operational capabilities and applications of UK defence equipment. Currently Peter Guest uses the DA's administrative support on an ad hoc basis which is showing some signs of strain as the ROK interest and enquiries build up. Moreover, in the near future the ROK Army and Air Force Headquarters are due to move out of Seoul, and this will place a further burden on the DA as he will have to travel much more extensively to keep in touch. Give the general state of traffic conditions in Seoul, I recommend that a case be considered for a car phone for the DA, who will otherwise become much less effective and productive under the new arrangements. I also recommend a review of the administrative support needed for the 2nd Sec Def Supply as his workload builds up, to ensure that the DA's existing resources are not overwhelmed and that we can respond effectively to growing ROK interest in UK weapons and equipment.
14. Finally, there is the question of the future of the UK's contribution to the UNC/MAC and the UNC Honour Guard. After 2 visits, I believe there is a realistic understanding that the UK contribution in these areas is largely symbolic and supportive without any actual or implied commitment to become involved in military operations should they arise. Our Ambassador queried the usefulness of our contribution to the Honour Guard and whether we should not now be thinking in terms of withdrawing it, consistent with the eventual handover of Hong Kong to the PRC. My own view, which I believe he accepted, is that the Honour Guard provides a most welcome change of environment and some useful low-key training for those normally serving in Hong Kong. More significant, I believe that any move now which gave the impressior. that, even if only in the longer term, we were considering reducing our commitment to the UNC/MAC and Honour Guard, would create an adverse impression out of all proportion to the resources involved. Furthermore, these unwelcome signals would be given to the ROK at a time when we need to capitalise on our past and current links as much as possible to support our defence
F VVISREPS/1
4 of 10 SECRET UK EYES A