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48B)
afloat should recognise that militarily there have been no changes to the threat
which have materially affected the tasks performed by the RN in Hong Kong waters
since CDS 7/87 was issued. Nevertheless, although any extension of the naval
presence afloat would principally be the result of a political commitment, for
fulfilment of that commitment to be credible any force provided must convey
recognisable military presence. But, whatever the naval force proposed by the
study, it should be noted that unless other sources of funding are made
available, financial provision could only be made at the expense of other items
currently funded in the Defence programme.
36. Inputs and Timescales. In recognition of the possibility of a political
commitment to provide some form of RN presence afloat in Hong Kong waters until
30 Jun 97, an MOD Navy study of the future RN presence has been commissioned by
MOD Central Staffs, with recommendations for the provision of a credible mili-
tary force to be presented by mid 1989. Inputs will be required from HMG, HKG,
MODUK, HQBF Hong Kong as well as other agencies. (HQ BF Hong Kong have under-
taken to draft, in conjunction with CAPIC, a role and an outline of the require-
ment for the future RN presence; this will be forwarded following endorsement by
the HKG Security Branch.) The abbreviated timescale has been imposed so that
findings are available at least 18 months ahead of the earliest notional
withdrawal of the third PC; this should permit notification of any pertinent
decisions to the PRCG
37.
Factors. It will be necessary to ascertain via analysis of a range of
options, an appropriate and credible level of operational capability in order
to provide the basis for proper deliberation and the subsequent development of
24
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ROW 113 (HONG)
Redacted under FOI exemption section 27(1)