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prescribed. As indicated previously, the rationale for these force levels is
addressed in greater detail at Annex B. There is no justification for amendment
of this policy direction at this stage, but the future needs will be addressed
by the study discussed in paragraph 31 below.
30. Helicopter Reinforcement Planning. The reduced aircrew availability asso-
ciated with the AE reductions proposed above could limit the ability to operate
the Wessex and Scout helicopters - particularly over an extended period in a
contingency situation. To resolve this difficulty, it will be necessary either
to adjust the in-theatre aircrew ratios or to have reserve crews available in
the UK to be flown out as reinforcements if required; the latter option is
likely to be the more economic and, particularly in the case of the LH, to be
the more practicable solution, given that the likely reinforcing Brigade (5 AB
Bde) continues to operate Scouts. This aspect is to be addressed by the study
discussed in the following paragraph.
31. HQBFHK 1989 Helicopter Study. CDS 7/87 commissioned a study to determine
the future helicopter support concept - to be completed by mid 1989. This study
was to be originated by CBF Hong Kong and sponsored by D Cts ROW; inputs by
DASD, D Air Off and DAAC are required. The provision has assumed greater
importance in view of the revised Concept of Operations, which will place
greater emphasis on reserve force mobility. The HQBFHK study should define the
peacetime helicopter flying tasks and the operational contingency requirements
and recommend the appropriate AE and IUR ratios and the optimum mix of Wessex
and Scouts for the rundown period post 1989. The study should also address
the helicopter crewing issues associated with reinforcement planning described
ROW 113 (HONG)
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