SECRET UK EYES A LOCSEN
by 1992 - should more helicopter support prove necessary. It will take time
before these assets become operational and it should also be recognised that
some of the Garrison's tasks may not be achieveable by the HKGFSD helicopter
unit, which is primarily a S&R organisation at this time. Thus the extent to
which the HKGFSD might provide effective helicopter support to the Garrison can-
not yet be quantified.
26. Wessex Force Level Planning. The planned reduction of the Wessex force -
with support from 2 HKGFSD Dauphin helicopters available - was limited in order
to satisfy an operational requirement to mount a "simultaneous half company
helilift". This requires a minimum of 6 Wessex (or similar) helicopters to
achieve. On initial examination, it could appear sensible to delay the run down
of the Wessex force until about 1990, by which time the HKGFSD should be ready
to provide helicopter support to the Garrison. However, 28 Sqn has been unable
to fly its authorised flying task during the past year and the task has there-
fore been reduced. For normal day-to-day tasking in Hong Kong, 6 Wessex is con-
sidered an adequate force. If the Wessex force is reduced to 6 AE plus 2 in use
reserves (IURs), it is judged that it should always be possible to generate 6
serviceable Wessex when and if a contingency should arise. The Wessex force
should therefore be reduced to 6 AE and 2 IUR in 1989, in accordance with the
existing CDS 7/87 planning timescale.
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27. Scout Planning. The operational requirement for Scout helicopters in Hong
-
Kong - as for Wessex helicopters is based on countering the threat of spontaneous
violence, which may occur at short notice. If an internal security threat is
not quickly controlled, the garrison must be able to demonstrate intent to
challenge Chinese intervention. CBF's Concept of Operations provides for the
ROW 113 (HONG)
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