28
If closed camps were to be adopted, scope for internal and international criticism of them is increased by the existence of the 1951 UN Convention relating to the status of refugees. Britain is a signatory but it does not apply to Hong Kong; but even though Hong Kong is not bound, it will be said to have strong moral force. Any answer given would have to stress the fact that these are not true but "economic" refugees, and are unlawfully in Hong Kong arising out of their illegal entry, for Article 31 of the Convention relates to a category of "unlawful refugees" and permits such "restrictions on movements" as are "necessary", until "this status is regularised or they obtain admission to another country".
Repatriation to Vietnam
29
In the longer term repatriation would seem to be the most attractive solution. However, such a solution presents difficulties. Not only would the refugees probably have to be repatriated against their wishes, but it would be necessary to convince the Vietnam Government to agree to the arrangement or devise some system which did not require it. So far, except in one or two individual cases, Vietnam has consistently made clear that it is not prepared to accept the return of people who leave by choice; and they recently restated this view to the UNHCR's Regional Co-ordinator for Refugees during a visit to Hanoi.
30
There would be severe practical difficulties in trying to send people back to Vietnam without the agreement of the authorities or some understanding and/or safeguard over their subsequent treatment. Power exists under sections 18 and 24 of the Immigration Ordinance to remove persons and to require the master of a vessel or aircraft to remove people from Hong Kong to a specified destination if an immigration officer so decides Vietnamese vessels call at Hong Kong, and in theory those persons the subject of removal could be put aboard them. However, if we did this without getting an assurance that such persons would not be ill-treated, we would face considerable international criticism for sending people back to persecution. Moreover, the Vietnamese authorities would be likely to refuse to allow them to disembark. A stalemate would then be reached.
31
The key to any real progress towards repatriation thus lies in bringing pressure to bear on the Vietnamese. This will require the active involvement of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. So far its advice has been that repatriation is not practicable. It is, therefore, proposed to take this up again stressing that the failure of resettlement countries to provide sufficient places leaves us in a difficult position and that in the light of changed circumstances it is essential to revert to this proposal.
CONFIDENTIAL