3 Assuming force is not used, it is hard to say in advance. whether Hanoi would accept (b) rather than (c). But it seems clear that to the extent that police resources are scaled down, the risk of non-acquiescence is liable to increase.
4 It may be that the only option for Ministers is to instruct the Hong Kong Government to use the minimum deployment of police resources which they judge necessary to secure acquiescence. Even then there is no guaranteeing that Hanoi, if and when it learns that police have been used, will accept that the operation falls within the terms of the 26 June agreement. (We are establishing by telegram overnight whether Hanoi needs to be notified in advance of the number of policemen on board the aircraft). We could ask them but only at the risk of a negative reaction and no repatriation.
5 My own personal view is that Hong Kong's operational plan involves such massive resources and preemptive precautions that it would be hard to argue that it does not constitute forcible repatriation, whether or not force is used.
My Lim т
DH Colvin
CA2ANH
CONFIDENTIAL