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(both of which are in any case questionable in present circumstances) would be lost. In the face of this risk, I cannot see what we would lose by concentrating our efforts in the immediate short run on accelerating the flow back to Vietnam of 1200 declared volunteers. If this should stimulate a further flow of volunteers as turnover picks up so much the better. Even if it does not we shall have removed our powerful line of criticism of HMG's current approach. The fact that current new arrivals in Hong Kong are down to about 11 a day until the weather changes in a couple of months gives us some leeway: time in which to have one final attempt to secure international agreement on involuntary repatriation measures, including UNHCR monitoring, at SC3 (resumed). If accelerating the return of volunteers requires intensified negotiations with Vietnam, coupled with inducements, are we worse off? Either we succeed thereby in increasing the flow or Hanoi is made to look recalcitrant. With the collapse of almost all her communist allies in East Europe, is not Vietnam's international position inherently very weak?
In any event (even if we proceed with the current plan) we must go back soon to the Vietnamese on modifications to the June agreement, on deterrents, and on aid. If we were to offer Baker on Monday a two stage UK official/Ministerial diplomatic offensive of this kind vis-a-vis Hanoi, with short run postponement of forcible repatriation, might we not extract some valuable prize from the Americans either in practical terms or by day of diplomatic solidarity?
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