SECRET
SECRET
277
011403
TOP CORHIAN 7965 a DIST ?
FM HANOI
TO
IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 510
OF 29030OZ SEPT 89
INFO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG, UKMIS GENEVA
FCO PERSONAL FOR PAUL HKD AND COLVIN SEAD
HONG KONG PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR
UKMIS GENEVA PERSONAL
/(272)
FOR AMBASSADOR
HONG TELNO 3174: REPATRIATION OF VBP
HKB 243/9
1. I ENTIRELY SYMPATHISE WITH THE GOVERNOR OVER HIS PREDICAMENT
AND AM OF COURSE PREPARED TO DO WHATEVER IS NECESSARY AND POSSIBLE
AT THIS END TO HELP. HOWEVER, AS YOU WELL KNOW FROM EARLIER TELEGRAMS (EG HANOI TELNO 459) WHAT IS PROPOSED IS HIGH RISK WE
HAVE NO GROUNDS FOR THINKING THAT THE VIETNAMESE WILL NOT REACT
NEGATIVELY TO ANY USE OF FORCE BY THE HONG KONG AUTHORITIES. THERE
MUST BE MORE THAN A FAIR CHANCE THAT THEY WILL REFUSE TO ACCEPT
THE RETURNEES ON ARRIVAL, ENSURE THAT THEY ARE TAKEN BACK ON THE
SAME AIRCRAFT AND DENOUNCE US FOR BREAKING THE TERMS OF THE
AGREEMENT CONCLUDED IN JUNE. WE SHALL THEN BE RATHER FURTHER BACK THAN SQUARE OFE, AS FAR AO THE VIETNAMESE ARE CONCERNED (LET LONE OTHER PLAYERS IN THE GAME).
2.IF YOU ARE PREPARED TO RUN THIS RISK, SO BE IT. ON MODALITIES, I WOULD RECOMMEND STRONGLY AGAINST GIVING THE VIETNAMESE A FEW
HOURS WARNING (PARA 5(E) OF TUR) THAT ''NORMAL INTERNATIONAL
IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES'' WILL BE USED. THIS WILL ALERT THEM TO
THE FACT THAT WE PROPOSE TO USE MINIMUM NECESSARY FORCE AND COULD
WELL LEAD TO AWKWARD QUESTIONS EVEN BEFORE THE AIRCRAFT HAD EVEN
TAKEN OFF AND POSSIBLY TO REFUSE TO GIVE LANDING PERMISSION. I WOULD
MUCH PREFER TO ATTEMPT TO BRAZEN IT OUT IF AND WHEN PROBLEMS ARISE.
·
3 I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE OFFER OF A BODY TO HELP WITH THE
MONITORING. LET US KNOW HOW THE FIRST SHIPMENT GOES BEFORE WE
DECIDE. I SHOULD POINT OUT THAT IF THE OFFICIAL CONCERNED IS
TO OPERATE IN ANY NORMAL SENSE AS PART OF THIS EMBASSY, HE WILL
FOR PECULIAR LOCAL REASONS NEED TO BE CLEARED TO UK SECRET.
DAVIES