VULIA
C
UA
D
C
c)
After SC3 on 4/5 December
If we wait until after SC3 we could plausibly claim to have held our hand until the possibilities of multilateral action had been exhausted. It would lend credibility to our claim to have done our utmost to preserve the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA). It would also give us more time to work on the UNHCR and the British Refugee Council over monitoring and orderly return. This suggests that we should go for the target date of Thursday 7 December.
Action with the Vietnamese
6 At SC3 the Vietnamese confirmed their willingness to abide by our bilateral but still secret agreement of 26 June 1989. We still need to sign the Agreed Minute on the modalities of repatriating the first group. Postponement has enabled us to say publicly that we have still not settled the terms, which has been useful with the press, particularly durina CROGM. However, we should not delay signature until the last possible minute in case there is a hitch which prevents the operation going ahead. I therefore recommend that we aim to sign about two weeks before the first repatriation, at the same time as we notify the Vietnamese of the date. If the target date of 7 December is accepted, this means signing on or about 23 November.
Further Negotiations with Vietnam
7
The 26 June Agreement states that "after the successful return of the first batch of repatriates, the process will continue with such modifications as both sides consider necessary. This means that we are committed to further negotiations with Vietnam on the terms and conditions of subsequent batches. Two questions arise:
a) should we initiate these negotiations before the first return in order to prepare the ground for further returns quickly thereafter?
b) how do we respond to Vietnamese interest, also stated in the 26 June Agreement, in "development aid to the areas in Vietnam where many clandestine departures take place?
8 If we were to propose further negotiations before the first return, it might give the Vietnamese a pretext for further emphasising their opposition to forcible repatriation to the point where even the first return is put in jeopardy. Similarly, it might signal to them that they have us on the run and lead them to raise their financial
CA4ANT
CONFIDENTIAL