BAGACS (9)
CONFIDENTIAL
I
Plan of Action.
A follow up meeting to the Geneva Conference on this is due to take place at official level in October.
(b) We should urge Hong Kong to undertake a more determined and sympathetic counselling effort in the camps. At present, it seems most counselling is done by the UNHCR and militates in the direction of dissuading people from volunteering or acquiescing. Yet we know that organisations such as Oxfam, Save the Children, and the British Refugee Council have in various ways and degrees
endorsed repatriation to Vietnam, voluntary and involuntary, provided there are safeguards. They could play a valuable role.
(c) We must think through carefully the full implications of monitoring. As long as the UNHCR refuse to cooperate, we will
either have to do it ourselves, through the Embassy, or enlist
the help of voluntary organisations. If the former, we would have to find all (or perhaps half, sharing with Hong Kong) the cost of a new diplomatic post in Hanoi. I see no prospect of the Hong Kong Government agreeing to pay all costs. But equally importantly monitoring by the Embassy would lack credibility, particularly as the numbers grow. Critics would certainly
question their impartiality. If we were to enlist the help of voluntary agencies we would have to provide financial assistance.
(d)
We should take the opportunity to review presentation of
our policy (see note by News Department, attached). There is in
my view an argument for coming out more into the open about the details of our agreement with the Vietnamese. That would avoid
accusations that we are working in secret because we are ashamed
of what we are doing. Yet in reality the agreement contains
safeguards of humane treatment and provisions for monitoring.
We have a good story to tell. We need to move from defence to
attack in the way we explain our policy to the media, both here
and internationally. On the other hand there is a risk that
publicising the details (for which we would in any case need the agreement of the Vietnamese), and in particular our intention not to use force, would create an adverse reaction in the camps
and make it more difficult to find suitable candidates to
CONFIDENTIAL