CONFIDENTIAL
IMMEDIATE
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But we must not 711 any way imply that they enjoy a veto on our activities. 6. WC are now working on ideas to improve monitoring and will revert 011 this. We would ideally want to
secure (possibly with US help
UNHCR involvement in monitoring of a non voluntary repatriation programme. But
are Looking at other ways of putting pressure on UNHCR, as
well
as alternative arrangements for independent monitoring (eg by NGOs) in support of the Embassy.
8.
We
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to
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7. Ministers attach particular
particular importance to a renewed effort increase public and foreign governmental understanding of are doing and why. There have been a number of ill informed (and therefore damaging) articles in the UK and international press. We need to restore the balance. It would be particularly helpful if you could suggest potential authors (eg Chris Bale of Oxfam) of Articles which we would
to get published here.
The attitude of mind of those who will be returned to Vietnam
is also a vital element in the programmes success. A delay at this time offers an opportunity to look again closely at counselling arrangements for those who are screened out. We should be devoting resources to counselling them in the first instance to volunteer, but failing this, to acquiesce in repatriation. They should be fully aware of the reintegration
assistance available to them and of the Vietnamese assurances
humane treatment. We are considering involving other NGOs in this work, and will be putting suggestions to NGO London headquarters. And we might also approach ICM on the question of counselling people to volunteer, an activity in which their
expertise was described in their pre-ICIR paper (UKMis Geneva telno 292 refers).
of
9. Ministers realise the risks involved in delaying progress on mandatory repatriation at this stage, including the possibility