BAGACS (10)
CONFIDENTIAL
acquiesce in repatriation.
But it is difficult to see how this
would be worse than the current uninformed speculation.
(e) We should in parallel launch a lobbying campaign in capitals to bring other governments up to date on what we are doing. Some (eg the Australians and ASEANs) are likely to be supportive. Others (eg the Canadians and EC countries) have shown varying degrees of sympathy but are genuinely unclear about what we are proposing to do. There is more we can and should be doing to win them round.
23. We would need to explain frankly to the Vietnamese the reasons for the delay, and stress in particular the desirability of squaring the Americans. (They should appreciate this point, as they have as much interest in avoiding bad publicity on repatriation as we do.) But in explaining this to the Vietnamese, we should make it clear that the delay is only temporary and that we shall want to go ahead with the non voluntary repatriation of non refugees as soon as it is practicable to do so.
24. No decision needs to be taken yet about the precise timing of the return of the first group of non volunteers. One advantage of delay until September, when Cabinet will have resumed, would be that it would enable the Secretary of State to inform OD (K) of our detailed plan. We would in any case need sufficient time to ensure that a respectable number of returnees (eg 40-60) had been
assembled.
But we must recognise that there are strong pressures from Hong Kong to press ahead as quickly as possible.
CONFIDENTIAT.
ARPAN
A R Paul