CONFIDENTIAL
4 The United States Government remains unhappy about our returning
boat people to Vietnam who are not strictly volunteer.
They have put pressure on us not to go through with it. Their attitude is inconsistent (they themselves deport to countries like Haiti and Nicaragua) and inhumane in so far as their only alternative is to allow the boat people to pile up indefinitely in holding camps.
5 The recent disturbance at Sek Kong is not the first, nor will it
be the last outbreak of violence in the detention camps.
As time
goes by and hopes of re-settlement fade, frustration is bound to
mount. An additional factor is that the camps have become over
crowded as a result of the high rate of new arrivals and many VBP
had to be moved around quickly as a result of recent typhoons.
6 I fear that we must expect continuing interest in the fate of the
VBP and criticism of our policy of returning those who are screened
out to Vietnam, if necessary on a non-voluntary basis. But there is
really no alternative to this policy, as even NGOs such as OXFAM and
Save the Children in Hong Kong now recognise.
JD7AFB
CONFIDENTIAL
VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE
CONFIDENTIAL
Background
1 The exodus of boat people began after the fall of Saigon in 1975
to the armed forces of Communist North Vietnam. The out-flow
reached crisis proportions in 1979 when, at British instigation, the first International Conference on boat people took place. conscience of the world was pricked, and the first Geneva Conference led to the doubling of the rate of resettlement in the West.
The
2 In the course of the 1980s, the out-flow began to change in character. The first departures were largely of people associated with the collapse of the non-Communist regime in South Vietnam
(including many Chinese). But gradually an increasing proportion of those leaving began to do so for economic, not political, reasons. At the same time, the willingness of resettlement countries to take VBP began to flag. By 1987/88 the number of VBP arrivals in Hong Kong led the Government to introduce a policy of screening to distinguish genuine refugees, (held pending re-settlement), from non-refugees (placed in closed camps pending repatriation).
3 At the time this policy was introduced in June 1988, the Vietnamese Government was not even prepared to discuss taking VBP back. Since then, through negotiation, we have persuaded them to take back volunteers (about 150 so far) and, most recently, non-volunteers who will go back without resisting.
4. Repatriation and screening now have international endorsement. The Geneva Conference in June 1989 prescribed the region-wide screening of VBP and recognised that in due course those screened out should ultimately go back. However, in the first instance, every effort should be made to persuade VBP to return voluntarily. The Conference also agreed that all those with refugee status (ie who arrived before the introduction of screening or who were subsequently screened in) should be re-settled over the next three
years.
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HONG KONG PUBLIC REACTION TO ICIR
FURTHER TO OUR TELNO 2035, WE HAVE SINCE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN A FULLER READING OF LOCAL PUBLIC REACTION. THIS IS INCLUDED IN THE WEEKLY TALKING POINTS'' PREPARED BY CITY AND NEW TERRITORIES ADMINISTRATION. WE ARE FORWARDING A COPY OF THE RELEVANT EXTRACT.
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TALKING POINTS 23 JUNE 1989
VRS AND VBP
RESPONDENTS EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE OUTCOME OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. THEY OPINED THAT THE CONFERENCE HAD FAILED TO ACHIEVE ANY CONCRETE MEASURES TO STOP THE EXODUS OF VBP OR TO SEND BACK THOSE ALREADY IN THE FIRST ASYLUM COUNTRIES. MOST OF THEM DISAGREED WITH THE DECISION TO HAVE A FURTHER ROUND OF CONFERENCE IN OCTOBER TO REVIEW THE PROGRESS OF THE SCREENING POLICY AND VOLUNTARY REPATRI- ATION. IN THEIR VIEW, THE CONTINUAL INFLUX OF VBP AND THE SMALL NUMBER OF VOLUNTARY RETURNS TO VIETNAM HAD DEMONSTRATED THE LACK OF DETERRENT EFFECT OF THE SCREENING POLICY. THEY THEREFORE CONSIDERED THE OCTOBER CONFERENCE UNNECESSARY AND WOULD DELAY A SOLUTION TO THE IMMEDIATE VBP PROBLEM IN HONG KONG. MANY RESPONDENTS MAINTAINED THAT THE INCREASING ARRIVALS OF VBP WOULD INCREASE THE BURDEN ON HONG KONG PARTICULARLY IN ACCOMMODATING THEM. THEY WERE ALSO NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT MUCH COULD BE ACHIEVED AT THE OCTOBER CONFERENCE. IN THIS CONNECTION, OUR CONTACTS PRPOSED A DIRECT DIALOGUE BETWEEN HONG KONG AND VIETNAM ON MANDATORY REPATRIATION. THEY NEVERTHELESS WERE DOUBT- FUL OF THE SINCERITY OF THE HANOI GOVERNMENT IN NEGOTIATING FOR A SOLUTION, AS THE OPPORTUNITY WOULD SURELY BE MADE USE OF TO BARGAIN FOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE.
2. MOST RESPNDENTS WELCOMED THE PLEDGE BY RESETTLEMENT COUNTRIES TO INCREASE THEIR IN-TAKE OF VRS FROM FIRST ASYLUM COUNTRIES. SOME HOWEVER EXPRESSED WORRIES THAT THIS DECISION MIGHT ENCOURAGE FURTHER EXODUS OF VBP AS THEY MIGHT FEEL THAT THEIR CHANCES OF RESETTLEMENT HAD BECOME GREATER.
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