15.
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Clearly, our aim at SC3 should be agreement that there are
only two possible "additional measures" (UNHCR monitored return and
one or other a regional holding centre) and these should be adopted as soon as it
accepted is recognised that the voluntary method has failed. If we achieve
that, we could plausibly argue when the first involuntary return
from Hong Kong takes place that we have merely anticipated agreement
Which of the CPA approach by a few months, granted Hong Kong's special circumstances (screening introduced more than a year before other
complementation
first asylum countries, overcrowding etc is fully justified.
Action with the Americans and others
16.
Between now and SC3 we should continue our efforts to the Americans persuade by to recognise the case for Hong Kong moving ahead on mandatory repatriation after SC3 because of its special circumstances. With US support, we also need to maintain pressure on UNHCR to do all they can to persuade boat people in Hong Kong to volunteer to return; and to agree to monitor all those who return,
whether volunteers or not. We are also approaching NGOs to see if they might be willing to undertake this task if UNHCR refuses.
17.
In addition we shall need to brief the Thais and Malaysians
of our intentions before SC3. We should make it clear that until
they have greater experience of voluntary repatriation and significant numbers of screened-out to return, they should not jump the gun, as the Americans fear. They are likely, nevertheless, to welcome our move which will break the impasse on this issue and
create a precedent for the future.
Alternatives to Mandatory Repatriation
18.
Subject to the outcome of SC3 and any dramatic increase in the number of volunteers, I believe that we should proceed with the first return of non-volunteers, under the terms of the arrangements already worked out with the Vietnamese, soon afterwards. I do not
believe that there
offer a better way out:
alternatives, which I now examine,
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