CONFIDENTIAL
of opinion will ever accept mandatory repatriation without question. Now that significant numbers of screened out boat people are
emerging from the screening process, it will be difficult to justify further delay. But embarking on a programme of mandatory
repatriation is not risk free. The key considerations are as
follows:
(a) Minimum force may be necessary in some cases,
cases, leading to adverse
publicity, which could affect the willingness of the Vietnamese to
cooperate with us over further non-voluntary returns.
(b) Our present agreement with Vietnam relates only to an initial
batch of non-volunteers. We would need to negotiate further to
achieve a programme of substantial and regular returns.
This may weil require a significant financial inducement to Vietnam, probably
in the form of assistance for the reintegration of returnees into
Vietnamese society.
(c) Monitoring must be part of any mandatory repatriation programme. Initially, and as long as the numbers were limited, we could carry
out monitoring ourselves, either through our Embassy in Hanoi or by.
ad hoc visits. But it would be greatly preferable if monitoring
could be undertaken by the UNHCR or by an impartial internationally
recognised body (which would require international acceptance of
mandatory repatriation.) The British Refugee Council have agreed to
see whether British NGOS might help (but have warned that HMG would
need to provide the finance).
(d) There could be an adverse reaction in the camps in Hong Kong to
mandatory repatriation, eg hunger strikes, rioting, etc. In the
worst case, we cannot rule out that the Governor might seek:
assistance from the British garrison to maintain order.
(e) We are likely to face American criticism, almost certainly
publicly, and hostility in Parliament and the press here..
10. We shall wish both to accelerate voluntary repatriation
and begin mandatory repatriation as soon as practicable after the
Steering Committee meeting (SC3) on 16/17 October; we shall need
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