CONFIDENTIAL
Preparatory Steps
4. Mr Maude asked about the timetable for the necessary preparatory steps on the assumption that we stuck to the 31 October target date. After some discussion, the following outline schedule was agreed:
10 October: warn Hong Kong and Hanoi that we were aiming for 31 October.
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15 October: lobby likely allies (eg Malaysia, Thailand, Australia, Japan) in advance of SC3.
16/17 October: SC3 (see para 8 below).
16 October onwards: begin briefing exercise in Kuala Lumpur, Geneva and London (see para 6 below).
- 17 October: formal 14 day notification to Vietnamese Government (and signature of financial agreement?)
30/31 October: Prime Ministerial message to President Bush (see separate minute).
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31 October.
key posts.
Repatriation Exercise.
Guidance telegram to
Shortly afterwards: further talks with Vietnam on the arrangements for further batches (Mr Maude asked for an early note on desirable improvements/changes to the existing agreement).
Mr Maude asked the department for a note fleshing out the details of the above (both he and the Secretary of State would like this in their weekend boxes).
Practical Arrangements
5.
Mr Haswell explained the steps that Hong Kong planned to take. The best time of day would be just before dawn in Hong Kong (both because resistance was less likely at that time and because news would come too late for the UK press, allowing Ministers to set the right tone on radio and TV in the morning). Mr Maude said that the Hong Kong Government should put in hand detailed arrangements which would minimise delay, the risk of disruption and visibility. Choosing the right sort of people would be vital. He asked for a detailed note on these arrangements, and on the profile of the group to be
sent back.
Press
Two different approaches were identified: on the one hand, we wanted to portray this exercise as following normal
6.
CONFIDENTIAL