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deportation procedures (albeit in abnormal circumstances). It should not be seen as very different in kind from
the voluntary programme of repatriation. This pointed to a low-key and purely reactive press campaign. On the other hand, we wanted to ensure the best possible media climate for the operation, which suggested a more aggressive and proactive approach particularly briefing leader writers, diplomatic correspondents, etc.
The
7.
Mr Maude favoured a steadily escalating campaign from the time of SC3. Our general intention to proceed with non-voluntary repatriation would become known at that time, and we could not deny that we had signed the agreement with Vietnam. At that time we should try to get as much domestic and international press opinion on our side as possible. Secretary of State would have the opportunity to brief diplomatic correspondents in Kuala Lumpur, and he was prepared to see selected leader writers and other key journalists in London. Mr Maude asked Mr Burns to give some further thought to how this might best be tackled.
8. There was general agreement that we should try to keep the actual date of the operation secret. Because of the need to book a flight, and agree timing with the Vietnamese, it would almost certainly leak in Hong Kong, but we should not volunteer the information. It was particularly important to keep the press away from the embarkation exercise in Hong Kong and the arrival in Vietnam. Logistically this should be possible.
Monitoring
9. Mr Colvin said that Mr Alf Dubbs was still working on the NGOS.
Frank Judd (Oxfam) had expressed some nervousness, and wished to internationalise the process by involving Refugee Councils from other countries (eg Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark). Mr Dubbs had promised to report back within a fortnight. Mr Maude said that if the NGOs could be persuaded to play ball then so much the better. But if not, we should have to make the best of it, through monitoring from the Embassy and ad hoc visits from the UK and Hong Kong,
Tactics at SC3
10.
Mr Maude said that he was generally content with the
(attached) draft steering brief. He would, however, like to be more
clear about the sort of language we wished to emerge from the meeting. Was there a danger that the USA would unravel the language agreed at SC2? Mr Covlin said that the USA might try, but would not succeed. But the Americans would try to veto endorsement of mandatory repatriation on the grounds that they had not yet been a "passage of reasonable time". It was
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