458
THE DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT IN HONG KONG
of receptions, cocktail parties, and trips to China. To a certain extent the Chinese organs in Hong Kong have been successful in co-opting businessmen, professionals, fledgling politicians and grassroots community leaders, who are flattered by the embrace of the Chinese motherland and at the same time afraid to reject it. A prominent sign of the 'united front''s success is the expanding list of dignitaries on the organizing committee of the People's Republic of China National Day celebrations, membership of which is now considered a symbol of patriotism, identification with the motherland and an indication of recognition by the Chinese authorities.
The important question is whether the core members of the democracy movement can withstand the strong temptation and pressure of the Chinese 'united front' strategy. What the Chinese authorities can offer includes prestigious membership of the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, an assured place in the local political establishment, credits from the local Chinese banks, and various lucrative business offers. On the other hand, antagonizing the Chinese authorities has resulted in all-out attempts at removal from elected public office as an example for the others. Cooperating with Beijing in order to do good for Hong Kong is certainly a persuasive argument, and the former chairman of Meeting Point and the present leader of the New Hong Kong Society have actually chosen to leave the democracy movement, with the former being handsomely rewarded.
There is no lack of opportunity for the pro-Beijing strategy within the democracy movement. A significant portion of the District Board members in the movement joined a political group within the movement only a year or less before the elections, and could present no record of dedicated contribution to the movement before that. Because of their socio-economic background these politicians may not be welcomed by the conservative camp, and membership of a democratic political group provides easy access to popular support in the District Board elections. They are obviously easy targets for the powerful 'united front' strategy. The organization of the democratic movement at the moment is also too weak to enforce strict discipline.
The Chinese authorities' stance on the possibility of political parties in Hong Kong appeared at the end of 1988 to have turned more flexible. Li Hou, a deputy director of the Chinese State Council's Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, indicated in an interview in Guangzhou in December 1988 that:
political groups will naturally form and develop when the portion of elected. members in the Legislative Council expands. We have no opposition to it.... But the issue will become more complicated if they develop into political parties. . . . The question is whether the Communist Party of China should operate openly if there are political parties in the territory. I can't give a definite answer of yes or no
now.
31
As the distinction between political groups and political parties is vague, the Chinese authorities were apparently keeping their options open.
1989 and the new political awareness
The release of the second draft of the Basic Law in February 1989 did not attract much attention in Hong Kong. The lack of response to the draft confirmed that political apathy had returned. The adoption of the proposal of Louis Cha fully demonstrated to the democracy movement and the community that Beijing had already made up its
31. South China Morning Post, 13 Dec. 1988.